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The bankruptcies or near failures of such organizations as Penn
Square Bank, E.S.M. Government Securities, and Continental Illi-
nois Bank have renewed interest in the problem of financial state-
ment fraud-the deliberate issuance of misleading financial reports.
During 1985 and 1986, the House Energy and Commerce Subcom-
mittee on Oversight and Investigations conducted 16 hearings' in
an attempt to uncover the reasons behind this recent wave of so-
called audit failures. 2 These hearings have prompted heated debate
about the proper roles of the reporting entity and the independent
auditor in detecting and preventing financial statement fraud.
Financial statement fraud directly harms the shareholders and
creditors of the issuer of a fraudulent financial report, since they
stand to lose all or part of their investments if such fraud results in a
bankruptcy or near failure. Fraudulent financial reporting also can
have a significant impact on the public's confidence in the integrity
of the financial reporting system. Decreased public confidence in
the reliability of financial information affects all financial statement
issuers, since investors and creditors will demand higher rates of re-
turn in the face of greater uncertainty about the accuracy of financial
reports.
Before evaluating the proposed solutions to this problem, it is
helpful to determine how widespread financial statement fraud has
become. Unfortunately, no precise method to measure the inci-
1. 132 Cong. Rec. E2986 (daily ed. Aug. 15, 1986) (statement of Rep. Wyden) [here-
inafter Wyden]. In addition, the Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee held hear-
ings on July 10, 22, and 27, 1987.
2. An "audit failure" occurs when a company experiences serious financial difficul-
ties soon after receiving an unqualified opinion by the independent auditor that the
company's financial statements are accurate. See Berton, Self-regulation by Accountants
Divides Industry, Wall St. J., June 20, 1986, at 21, col. 2.
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dence of such fraud has been developed. 3 The conventional mea-
surement is the proportion of audits that result in litigation alleging
financial statement fraud.4 Although 50,000 audits were performed
over a recent five-year period,just over 100 lawsuits were filed alleg-
ing audit failure. 5 These figures suggest that about 99.8% of all au-
dits are free of financial statement fraud.
While chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC), John S. R. Shad concluded that "[t]he evidence concerning
alleged audit failures suggests that the system is working well."
6
Shad noted that auditing firms that are members of the SEC Practice
Section of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
(AICPA) must report any allegations of audit failure made in con-
nection with a filing prepared for the SEC. 7 Since this requirement
was initiated in 1979, only 176 such cases have been reported, less
than one percent of the audits performed during that period.8
The frequency of litigation alleging financial statement fraud,
however, provides only an imprecise measurement of the actual oc-
currence of such fraud. This measurement, by definition, is under-
inclusive, because it does not include the unlitigated instances of
fraudulent financial reporting. It is also overinclusive, since an alle-
gation of financial statement fraud does not mean that such fraud
actually occurred. Because the number of alleged frauds has been
quite small in relation to the thousands of financial statements is-
sued each year, the actual level of fraud is unlikely to be of crisis
proportion, as some insist.9
3. See Elliott & Jacobson, Detecting and Deterring Financial Statement Fraud, Corp.
Acct., Fall 1986, at 34 ("the study of financial statement fraud is plagued by inadequate
measurement techniques..."); SEC and Corporate Audits (Part 6): Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm. on Energy and Com-
merce on Detecting and Disclosing Financial Fraud, 99th Cong. 2d Sess. 293 (1986)
[hereinafter Hearings] ("... the Commission has been unable (and is unaware of any
study that has been able) to quantify the nature and impact of such fraud.") (statement
ofJohn S.R. Shad, Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission).
4. Elliott &Jacobson, supra note 3, at 35.
5. Price Waterhouse, Challenge and Opportunity for the Accounting Profession:
Strengthening the Public's Confidence (1985).
6. Hearings, supra note 3, at 292.
7. Id. Such reporting is made to the Professional Oversight Board. See infra note 12
for a description of the SEC Practice Section and the Professional Oversight Board.
8. Id.
9. See, e.g., Wyden, supra note 1, at E2987 (statement by Rep. Wyden characterizing
financial statement fraud as a "glaring problem" and noting that "[alithough the vast
majority of business persons and auditors are honest, responsible citizens, there is no
question that a growing minority are trying to skirt or ignore our laws and take improper
advantage of our citizens.")
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Nevertheless, even a small amount of such fraud can affect both
investors and creditors of the financial statement issuer as well as
confidence in the financial reporting process in general. Public con-
fidence depends both on the actual incidence of financial statement
fraud and on the public's perception of the amount of such fraud tak-
ing place. Thus, even if the actual level of financial statement fraud
is low, investors may perceive that a problem exists, making some ac-
tion necessary to enhance investor confidence in the reporting
system.
This Current Topic considers proposals from three of the most
influential actors in the debate on financial statement fraud: Con-
gress, Price Waterhouse, and the National Commission on Fraudu-
lent Financial Reporting. Part I provides a brief summary of the
proposed reforms. Parts II and III evaluate aspects of these propos-
als that concern the responsibilities of the reporting company and
the duties of the independent auditor. Part IV analyzes those sug-
gestions in the proposals that relate to the accounting profession's
quality control program. Finally, the Current Topic recommends
the cost-effective action needed to combat the problem of financial
statement fraud.
Because the available data indicate that the actual incidence of
such fraud is low, much of the suggested action focuses on promot-
ing public confidence in the financial reporting system rather than
making costly structural changes. Primary emphasis is placed on en-
hancing the competence and independence of the internal audit
staff and increasing the severity of sanctions imposed on the perpe-
trators of fraudulent financial reporting. Because the independent
auditor is already subject to effective market constraints and to con-
siderable legal duties, this Current Topic suggests that the public
auditor's responsibilities should not be substantially increased.
I. Background
Concern over highly publicized audit failures has prompted sev-
eral institutions to examine the problem of financial statment fraud.
The proposed solutions of Congress, Price Waterhouse, and the Na-
tional Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting, which have
received the most attention, are examined below.
A. Congressional Activity
For the second time in ten years, the accounting profession has




following disclosures of audit failures and questionable corporate
payments to foreign governments, Congress examined the federal
government's role in setting accounting standards and criticized the
profession's standard-setting procedure as lacking due process and
public participation. '0
The profession quickly responded to these congressional con-
cerns. The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) altered
its standard-setting procedure in 1977 to provide greater public ac-
cess. I In addition, the AICPA reorganized, creating a new Division
for CPA Firms, comprised of the SEC Practice Section (SECPS) and
the Private Companies Practice Section (PCPS). The AICPA also
established an oversight board with public representation to moni-
tor peer reviews of firms that are members of the SEC Practice Sec-
tion.i2 The profession then convinced Congress to refrain from
interfering with this self-regulatory program. 13
In the early 1980s, however, several large businesses and financial
institutions experienced serious difficulties unforeseen by their in-
dependent auditors. 14 Many members of the public believed that
the auditors should have been aware of the problems and should
have provided an appropriate warning to investors.' 5 In 1986, Rep-
resentative Ronald Wyden, a member of the House Energy and
Commerce Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, re-
10. See Moran & Previts, The SEC and the Profession, 1934-84: The Realities of
Self-Regulation, J. Acct., July 1984, at 74, 76.
11. Id. at 76.
12. In addition to the SEC Practice Section (SECPS), the AICPA also established the
Private Companies Practice Section (PCPS). Membership in either section is voluntary.
The SECPS is designed for CPA firms that audit SEC registrants, and its membership
requirements include: (1) members must report disagreements with management about
accounting, auditing, or disclosure matters to the client's audit committee; (2) a member
firm must assign a new audit partner to be in charge of an audit if another partner has
been in charge for a period of seven consecutive years; (3) each professional in the mem-
ber firm must have 120 hours of continuing professional education every three years;
and (4) each member firm must submit to peer reviews, in which another firm or a team
of AICPA officials evaluates the firm's quality control system, at least once every three
years. The peer review results must be made available to the public.
The AICPA has set up a special committee, the Professional Oversight Board, made
up of respected individuals largely from fields other than accounting, to monitor the
activities of the SECPS. For a more detailed description of the SECPS, see A. Arens &J.
Loebbecke, Auditing: An Integrated Approach 20-23 (3d ed. 1984); Kunitake & Der-
smith, The AICPA's Peer Review Program: Implications for Bankers, J. Com. Bank
Lending, July 1985, at 57-61.
13. Price Waterhouse, supra note 5, at 5.
14. Among the most notable organizations to experience such difficulties were:
Continental Illinois Bank, Penn Square Bank, United American Bank, Frigitemp Corp.,
E.S.M. Government Securities, Drysdale Government Securities, and O.P.M. Leasing
Services, Inc.
15. Price Waterhouse, supra note 5, at 6.
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sponded to these concerns by introducing H.R. 5439.16 This bill
proposed that the independent auditor be responsible for uncover-
ing only that fraud which has a material effect on the accuracy of the
financial statements.' 7 H.R. 5439 also would have required the au-
ditor to report a discovered error or irregularity to governmental
authorities if the issuer failed to correct and report the problem
within 90 days. In addition, the bill mandated that management set
up adequate internal administrative controls' 8 and periodically eval-
uate these controls. The bill also proposed that management be re-
quired to evaluate the internal accounting controls mandated by the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977.19
B. Price Waterhouse Proposal
In response to the renewed congressional interest in the account-
ing profession, Price Waterhouse, a "Big Eight" public accounting
firm, published a comprehensive position paper on financial state-
ment fraud in late 1985.20 The paper recommends attacking finan-
cial statement fraud by revising auditing standards and changing the
structure and organization of the accounting profession.
Price Waterhouse suggests changing auditing standards to re-
quire the independent auditor to perform two new duties: (1) to
review and evaluate internal management controls (regardless of
16. H.R. 5439, 99th Cong. 2d Sess., 132 Cong. Rec. E2986 (daily ed. Aug. 15, 1986).
H.R. 5439 is a revised version of the Financial Fraud Detection and Disclosure Act (H.R.
4886), which was introduced by Rep. Wyden in May 1986. At the time this article went
to press, no legislation relating to financial statement fraud had been introduced in the
100th Congress.
17. H.R. 4886 would have required the independent auditor to ferret out all fraud,
no matter how material its effect on the financial statements. The SEC and accounting
and business leaders criticized H.R. 4886 for its failure to provide a materiality standard.
The SEC has estimated that failure to provide such a standard could increase audit fees
three to four times present levels, not including the costs associated with increases in
auditor liability (such as insurance costs) and the additions to SEC and Justice Depart-
ment enforcement budgets needed to investigate reported violations. See Hearings,
supra note 3, at 300-01. Auditors simply do not have the training needed to identify all
illegal or irregular activities. They have limited legal expertise and would thus have
difficulty in identifying violations of regulations in such areas as health and safety and
the environment. Id. A materiality standard is, therefore, an essential part of any cost-
effective solution to the problem of financial statement fraud.
18. Auditing standards distinguish between "administrative controls" and "account-
ing controls." Administrative controls are defined as including, but not limited to "the
plan of organization and the procedures and records that are concerned with the deci-
sion processes leading to management's authorization of transactions." Accounting
controls are defined as "the plan of organization and the procedures and records that
are concerned with the safeguarding of assets and the reliability of financial records
.... Price Waterhouse, supra note 5, at 25.
19. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(A) (1982).
20. Price Waterhouse, supra'note 5.
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whether the auditor relies on such controls in determining the scope
of auditing procedures); and (2) to examine the company's business
environment for symptoms of potential financial statement fraud.
In addition, Price Waterhouse suggests that the accounting profes-
sion's quality control system be placed under the auspices of a statu-
tory self-regulatory organization.
C. The National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting
The National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting
(NCFFR) was formed in the summer of 1985 in order to gain deeper
insight into the problem of financial statement fraud. The six-mem-
ber Commission and its staff is sponsored and funded by the
AICPA, the American Accounting Association, the Financial Execu-
tives Institute, the Institute of Internal Auditors, and the National
Association of Accountants. 2' The NCFFR, commonly known as the
Treadway Commission, 22 has made a number of proposals designed
to combat fraudulent financial reporting. These proposals, summa-
rized in a report released in April 1987, focus on the reporting com-
pany, the independent auditor, enforcement objectives, and
education.23
II. Responsibilities of the Reporting Company to Detect and Prevent
Financial Statement Fraud
Many proposals have placed primary emphasis on the role of the
independent auditor in deterring financial statement fraud. How-
ever, a close examination of the problem suggests that real reduc-
tions in fraud can best be accomplished by focusing on persons
within the reporting entity itself. This Part examines the role of the
reporting company in detecting and preventing fraudulent financial
reporting.
21. See Treadway, Krogstad & Sunderland, Financial Reporting and Public Confi-
dence, Corp. Acct., Fall 1986, at 4-5.
22. The NCFFR is chaired by James C. Treadway, a securities lawyer and former
SEC Commissioner.
23. National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting, Report of the National
Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting (Exposure Draft) (1987) [hereinafter
Treadway Commission Report). Due to space constraints, I have only selected from the
report what I consider to be the most interesting and relevant proposals for analysis in
this Current Topic.
The Treadway Commission Report was discussed at the July 10, 1987, hearings of the
House Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. Repre-
sentative Wyden emerged from these hearings with several criticisms of the Report. See
Berg, House Reception Mixed to Accounting Report, N.Y. Times, July 13, 1987, at D4,
col. 5.
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A recent Treadway Commission study of alleged frauds revealed
that: (1) 66% of the alleged frauds involved upper-level manage-
ment; (2) 87% of the frauds studied were perpetrated through the
use of misleading financial information (e.g., overstatement of as-
sets or improper revenue recognition) rather than actual theft of
corporate assets; and (3) in 45% of the cases examined, the SEC
alleged that the fraud resulted from a breakdown in internal con-
trols.2 4 In light of these findings, many of the Commission's recom-
mendations are aimed at ensuring that internal controls are
instituted and monitored. H.R. 5439 also focuses on strengthening
the reliability of the reporting entity's internal control system.
2 5
Improving the reliability of the internal control system would
yield great benefits by reducing the incidence of internal control
breakdowns. A requirement that management maintain an ade-
quate internal control system would thus be an important part of
any effort to prevent and detect financial statement fraud.
A. Expanding the Internal Audit Function
The internal auditor is an often overlooked actor in the financial
reporting process. The NCFFR, however, suggests that the SEC re-
quire all public companies to maintain an internal audit function
and that this function be given an appropriate degree of organiza-
tional independence. Such autonomy is necessary to ensure that the
internal audit staff can effectively monitor the preparation of finan-
cial statements. In order to achieve this independence, the Tread-
way Commission would require the chief internal auditor to report
to the chief executive officer or to a senior financial officer who is
not directly involved in preparing the financial statements. 26 More-
over, the Commission would give the chief internal auditor direct
access to the audit committee, so that he or she could report any
fraudulent reporting uncovered. 27
Two studies by the Institute of Internal Auditors indicate that in-
dependent auditors are increasingly relying on the work of internal
auditors, particularly in the audit of computerized systems. These
studies conclude that the effectiveness of internal auditors in
24. Treadway Commission Report, supra note 23, at 116. The study examined 119
actions brought by the SEC against public companies and 42 SEC actions brought
against independent auditors between July 1, 1981, and August 6, 1986.
25. See supra notes 18, 19 and accompanying text.





preventing and detecting fraud can be improved through "en-
hanced organizational status and professionalism.- 28
Since the internal auditors can directly monitor internal control
adequacy and financial statement preparation, the Treadway Com-
mission correctly characterizes their role as helping to provide "the
first line of defense against fraudulent financial reporting." 29 Thus,
requiring all public companies to maintain an internal audit function
should reduce the incidence of such fraud. The NCFFR's sugges-
tion to have the chief internal auditor report directly both to a top
officer not involved with the preparation of the financial statements
and to the audit committee would help ensure that the internal audit
group will be an effective monitor of the financial statement prepa-
ration process, free of coercion from potential perpetrators of
fraudulent reporting. In addition to these reforms, professional cer-
tification of internal auditors should be required and increased em-
phasis should be placed on the development of, and adherence to,
internal auditing standards.3 0 This will help to ensure that internal
auditors have sufficient technical competence to provide an effective
"first line of defense."
B. Requiring Companies to Maintain Vigilant Audit Committees
A recent Treadway Commission study revealed that 31% of the
companies involved in actions brought by the SEC since 1980 did
not have an audit committee.3' Thus, the absence of such a commit-
tee may help to encourage fraudulent financial reporting. Publicly
held corporations should be required to have audit committees.3 2 A
vigilant audit committee can effectively monitor the internal control
system.33 A committee that is readily accessible to the internal audit
staff should help to detect and prevent breakdowns in this system.
28. Initial Conclusions of the National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Report-
ing, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,035, at 88,285 (Oct. 29, 1986) [hereinafter cited as
Treadway Commission Initial Conclusions].
29. Id. at 88,286.
30. The Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA) has granted certification for internal au-
ditors since 1974. Certification, however, has never been required. Adherence to IIA
standards is also not required. Elliott & Jacobson, supra note 3, at 39.
31. Treadway Commission Report, supra note 23, at 116. See supra note 24 for a de-
scription of the data examined in the study.
32. Treadway Commission Report, supra note 23, at 35. The Treadway Commission
would require such committees to be made up solely of independent directors.
33. The problem, of course, is assuring that the audit committee will in fact be a
vigilant monitor. See Levmore, Monitors and Freeriders in Commercial and Corporate
Settings, 92 Yale LJ. 49, 62 (1982) ("casual evidence suggests that outside directors
become friendly peers of their codirectors rather than inquisitive and pressing
monitors"). The independent directors who are audit committee members might, how-
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The Treadway Commission would require the chairman of the au-
dit committee to include a report of the committee's activities over
the past fiscal year in the annual report to shareholders.3 4 In addi-
tion, the NCFFR has authored a set of practice guidelines for audit
committees, designed both to advise the committee members and to
alleviate the current director liability problem 35 by enabling mem-
bers to assert compliance with the guidelines as a defense in
litigation.
3 6
Since most companies already have such committees 3 7 the costs
of this proposal would not be great. In addition, the NCFFR prac-
tice guidelines should improve committee diligence and may help
combat the problem of attracting quality directors.
38
C. Other Suggested Duties of Management
Although review and evaluation of internal controls play vital
roles in the prevention of financial statement fraud, requiring man-
agement to express an opinion on internal control adequacy, as the
Treadway Commission recommends,39 would be an inefficient use
of corporate resources. Management's crucial responsibility is to
implement an effective system of internal controls. Since the in-
dependent auditor is already required to review and evaluate inter-
nal controls (at least to the extent that such controls are relied on in
performing the audit), there is no need for management to dupli-
cate this function. Public reporting by management on internal con-
trols would not reduce the incidence of fraud and would do little to
enhance public confidence, since most investors would likely be un-
ever, face reputational losses from mismonitoring which would exceed any direct bene-
fits from such misbehavior. See id.
34. Treadway Commission Report, supra note 23, at 37.
35. See Lewin, Director Insurance Drying Up, N.Y. Times, Mar. 7, 1986, at Dl (At-
tracting quality directors is becoming more difficult due to the decreased availability of
director liability insurance, a consequence of the large damage awards commonly being
awarded in litigation against corporate directors.)
36. Treadway Commission Initial Conclusions, supra note 28, at 88,285.
37. See Acct. Series Release No. 296, [1937-1982 Acct. Series Releases Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 72,318, at 62,939 (Aug. 20, 1981) (noting that in a
1980 survey of proxy statement information, 84% of the registrants surveyed had audit
committees). See also Jenkins & Robinson, The Corporate Audit Committee, Mgmt.
Acct., Dec. 1985, at 31-32. New York Stock Exchange rules require listed domestic com-
panies to establish an audit committee made up solely of independent directors. The
American Stock Exchange, the AICPA, and the SEC recommend, but do not require
publicly owned companies to have audit committees. The SEC does, however, require a
corporation to disclose whether or not it has an audit committee. Id. at 32.
38. Courts could use these guidelines to define a standard of care that would shield
those directors who comply with the guidelines from liability in the event of a fraud,
thereby reducing the risk of being a director.




able to accurately interpret the information included in such a
report.
Moreover, the costs of a public reporting scheme could be quite
high. In 1979, the SEC proposed that management report on the
adequacy of internal accounting controls (in Form 10-K and in an-
nual reports to shareholders) and that the auditor report on man-
agement's assessment. 40 A survey of 500 companies indicated that a
management report on internal accounting controls would cost
about $94,000 per company per year.
41
The NCFFR would also require management to acknowledge in
the annual report its responsibilities for the accuracy of the financial
statements and the adequacy of internal controls. 42 Such an ac-
knowledgement might help eliminate the perception that the in-
dependent auditor is an insurer of financial statement accuracy.
43
Without an accompanying change in the legal rules that define audi-
tor liability, however, this acknowledgement would not deter a de-
frauded investor from suing the independent auditor. Thus, this
proposal would do little to reduce the increasing exposure of audi-
tors to crippling damage awards in litigation.
D. Increasing the Sanctions Imposed on Perpetrators of Financial
Statement Fraud
Imposing more severe sanctions on the perpetrators of financial
statement fraud might help reduce the incidence of such fraud. In a
recent survey of financial executives, corporate secretaries, internal
auditors, lawyers, and public accountants, 83% of those surveyed
recommended that more severe penalties be assessed against the
perpetrators of financial statement fraud. 44 The Treadway Commis-
40. Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC Roundtable: Financial Reporting
and the Role of the Independent Auditor (1986) at 9 [hereinafter SEC Roundtable].
41. Hearings, supra note 3, at 304. The Financial Executives Institute conducted the
survey. The Treadway Commission does suggest some ways to reduce this cost. The
Commission recommends that, unlike the 1979 SEC proposal, management only report
on "material matters about which stockholders reasonably should be informed." Tread-
way Commission Report, supra note 23, at 40. The Commission also notes that a report
on internal controls would be more informative to investors if it is made part of a larger,
comprehensive management report. Id.
42. Treadway Commission Report, supra note 23, at 39.
43. See Mednick, The Auditor's Role in Society: A New Approach to Solving the
Perception Gap,J. Acct., Feb. 1986, at 70-72 (discussing the increasing gap between the
auditors' stated objectives and users' perceptions of the purpose of the auditors' report.)
Mednick points to a growing expectation that the auditor will give an early warning to
investors when a client is making poor business decisions or is near financial ruin. Id. at
72.
44. Treadway Commission Initial Conclusions, supra note 28, at 88,286. The Uni-
versity of Southern California's School of Accounting conducted the survey.
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sion recommends that those found to "cause, aid and abet, or par-
ticipate in fraudulent financial reporting" be barred from corporate
office. 45 While recognizing the severity of this penalty, the NCFFR
points out that there is no reason to treat corporate perpetrators
differently from independent auditors, who, pursuant to SEC Rule
2(e),46 may be barred from practice before the SEC for violations of
the securities laws. The Treadway Commission also advocates more
criminal prosecutions and longer sentences for those who engage in
financial statement fraud.
4 7
Barring the perpetrators of financial statement fraud from corpo-
rate office should reduce the incidence of financial statement fraud.
Fines are usually used to punish the perpetrators of such fraud.
Fraudulent financial reporting is, however, difficult to detect. As a
result, optimal deterrence requires fines to be set at very high
levels. 48 Since the effectiveness of fines depends in part on the asset
levels of wrongdoers, 49 barring wrongdoers from corporate office
can provide greater levels of deterrence than fines alone. One dan-
ger of adopting such a severe penalty is the possibility that innocent
managers, fearful of being wrongfully suspected of engaging in
fraud, may become more risk averse.50 This concern, however, may
not be well founded. Auditors, for example, are already subject to
the threat of being barred from practice, and no one has seriously
objected to the ill effects of this possibility on auditor behavior. In
addition, if adequate due process protections are adopted to mini-
mize the risk of error, and if the availability of such protections is
publicized, innocent corporate officers are not likely to alter their
behavior considerably.
III. Responsibilities of the Independent Auditor to Detect and Prevent
Financial Statement Fraud
While most proposals have focused primarily on measures aimed
at the independent auditor, it is questionable whether any substan-
45. Id.
46. 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e) (1987).
47. Treadway Commission Initial Conclusions, supra note 23, at 88,286.
48. See generally A. M. Polinsky, An Introduction to Law and Economics 73-84 (1983).
49. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement Strategy, 2
J.L. Econ. & Org. 53, 57 (1986) [hereinafter Kraakman, Gatekeepers]; See also Kraakman,
Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal Controls, 93 Yale L.J. 857, 867-68
(1984) [hereinafter Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies].
50. Kraakman, Gatekeepers, supra note 49, at 57. It is, of course, not in the share-
holders' best interests for management to be too risk averse. In fact, shareholders, be-
cause they can hold diversified portfolios, prefer reasonable risk-taking by management.




tial increase in the independent auditor's duties would be cost-
effective. The independent auditor is a "reputational intermedi-
ary," 5 ' subject to powerful market constraints. 52 There is substan-
tial evidence that concerns with preserving reputation play a key
role in the market for auditing services. 53
Reputation, however, does have its limits as a constraint on audi-
tor behavior.54 Thus, the independent auditor also faces legal liabil-
ity, which supplements market incentives. 55 Since accountants have
always been subject to legal liability, the real issue is whether it is
cost-effective to extend this liability by imposing more stringent
legal duties on auditors. Extending these duties too far presents se-
rious risks, 56 since the profession is already paying out hefty damage
51. A reputational intermediary is someone who is paid to verify the accuracy of
another party's information. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers, 94 Yale L.J.
239, 289 (1984) [hereinafter Gilson, Value Creation], citing Gilson & Kraakman, The
Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 Va. L. Rev. 549, 604-07, 618-21 (1984). Lawyers
and accountants often serve as reputational intermediaries. Id. at 290.
52. Kraakman, Gatekeepers, supra note 49, at 61-62 (classifying accountants as "mar-
ket gatekeepers"). A "gatekeeper" is one who prevents misconduct by withholding sup-
port (such as certification of financial statements) that is necessary for the wrongdoing to
succeed. Id. at 54. A "market gatekeeper" is a gatekeeper who faces "powerful private
incentives to deter misconduct." Id. at 62. Accountants face strong market incentives to
maintain their reputations by refusing to support fraudulent financial reporting.
53. Gilson, Value Creation, supra note 51, at 291 (companies about to go public
often switch to a more reputable, Big Eight auditing firm), citing Benston, The Market
for Public Accounting Services: Demand, Supply and Regulation, 2 Acct. J. 2 (1979),
DeAngelo, Auditor Size and Audit Quality, 3 J. Acct. & Econ. 183 (1981).
54. Kraakman, Gatekeepers, supra note 49, at 96-100 (reputation can be a "noisy
signal"). Investors do not usually observe the actual quality of the auditor's services;
rather, they only observe the subsequent performance of the audited firm. Thus, inves-
tors may wrongly discount the reputation of an auditor where the audited firm fails for
reasons which were beyond the monitoring responsibilities of the auditor. See id. at 97
(making this argument in the context of underwriters' activities).
In addition, if investors evaluate particular auditors in light of the average perform-
ance of all auditors and reevaluate all auditors in light of the unexpected performance of
individual auditors, there can be serious free-rider problems. See id. at 98, citing Lynch,
Miller, Plott, and Porter, Product Quality, Informational Efficiency, and Regulations in
Experimental Markets at 60-61, 66-72 (unpublished draft on file with the author) [here-
inafter Lynch et. al]. Such free-rider problems limit the effectiveness of reputation as a
constraint on auditors.
55. Kraakman, Gatekeepers, supra note 49 at 99 (gatekeeper liability superimposed
on reputational incentives might improve enforcement efficiency). But see id. n. 118
("[I]mperfect legal regulation might also impede the development of effective reputa-
tional controls.")
56. If increased legal duties make auditing services too expensive, use of such serv-
ices might be reduced wherever legally permitted. Id. at 77 (tax shelter promoters reluc-
tant to provide investor with tax opinions following increased regulation of such
opinions).
Auditors might also refuse to accept engagements with risky firms in response to in-
creased legal duties. Id.
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awards 57 and is finding it increasingly difficult to attract quality per-
sonnel. 58 The discussion below outlines the appropriate role of the
independent auditor in uncovering fraudulent financial reporting.
A. Examining Internal Controls
Current auditing standards require the independent auditor to
test and evaluate internal controls only if he or she wants to rely on
such controls to limit the number of substantive tests performed
during the audit. 59 The auditor's review and evaluation of internal
controls relate primarily to accounting controls. These controls
bear directly on the reliability of the financial reporting system,
which, unlike administrative controls, only have an indirect effect on
financial statements. 6
0
Requiring auditors to review and evaluate all internal controls, as
was proposed in H.R. 5439, would likely be cost-effective. While
the additional costs that this requirement would impose are not cer-
tain, most audits already include a review and evaluation of internal
accounting controls. 6' By reviewing and evaluating internal admin-
istrative and accounting controls, the auditor would gain valuable
insight into the organization and structure of the firm being au-
dited. 62 Joseph Connor, Chairman of Price Waterhouse, has sug-
gested that the costs of an increased review of internal controls
would be low, and he has heard positive feedback from senior finan-
cial personnel concerning the benefits of such a review. 63
It is not as obvious, however, that requiring auditors to publicly
report on the adequacy of internal controls, as proposed in H.R.
5439, would be cost-effective. Some business and regulatory lead-
ers believe that the benefits of such reporting would be significant
57. See, e.g., Yang, Watching Pinocchio's Nose, Forbes, Nov. 4, 1985, at 73 (Big Eight
firms have paid out almost $180 million in damages since 1980); Weiss, Auditors Own
Up to the Cost of Their Errors, Bus. Week, Apr. 1, 1985, at 34.
58. Indeed, Dean John Burton of the Columbia Graduate School of Business be-
lieves that the increasing inability to attract quality personnel is the most serious prob-
lem facing the accounting profession today. Crisis in Accounting: New Controls on the
Profession, Corp. Acct., Fall 1986, at 15-16 [hereinafter Burton].
59. A. Arens &J. Loebbecke, supra note 12, at 270.
60. Price Waterhouse, supra note 5, at 25. Thus, under current auditing standards,
the independent auditor need not review administrative controls, except where they are
inseparable from accounting controls. Id. See supra note 18 for a description of account-
ing controls and administrative controls.
61. SEC Roundtable, supra note 40, at 8 (comment byJ. Michael Cook, Chairman,
AICPA).
62. The auditor should, however, only be required to review the internal controls for
matetial weaknesses.
63. SEC Roundtable, supra note 40, at 9.
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and that the costs would not outweigh these benefits, while others
argue that public reporting on the adequacy of internal controls
"would be expensive, and of limited value. ' 64 Current standards
already require the auditor to report to management and the board
of directors any material control weaknesses that he or she uncov-
ers.6 5 Such weaknesses may lead to an increase in the scope of audit
tests or to a conclusion that the auditor cannot certify the financial
statements. 66
The review, evaluation, and reporting required under current au-
diting standards go a long way to reduce the incidence of fraud.
The only additional benefit of requiring public reporting would be
any increase in investor confidence that such reporting might spur.
Given the potential inability of many investors to accurately inter-
pret such a report, however, such increases in confidence are likely
to be small.
B. Reviewing the Client's Business Environment
In addition to requiring the independent auditor to review and
evaluate internal controls, Price Waterhouse recommends that the
independent auditor be required to examine a company's business
environment for "symptoms" of financial statement fraud. The
AICPA has developed a list of such symptoms, which includes: (1) a
highly domineering senior management accompanied by either an
ineffective board of directors or by compensation tied to reported
performance; (2) deterioration of earnings quality, as evidenced by a
decline in sales volume or quality or by excessive interest of senior
management in the effect of accounting alternatives on earnings per
share; and (3) business conditions that may create unusual pres-
sures, such as inadequate working capital, major investment in a vol-
atile industry, and debt restrictions with little flexibility (e.g.,
required working capital ratios and limitations on additional bor-
rowings). 67 The AICPA also includes a list of sample audit proce-
dures that can be used to test for each potential symptom of
financial statement fraud.
6 8
Requiring the auditor to search for these red flags is an amplifica-
tion of Statement on Auditing Standards No. 22 (SAS 22), which
already requires the auditor to obtain "[a] reasonable understand-
64. Id. at 9-10.
65. Id. at 10 (comment by Joseph E. Connor).
66. Id.
67. Price Waterhouse, supra note 5, at 40-41.
68. Id. at 40-46.
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ing of the client's business and industry" 69 and to consider
"[c]onditions that may require extension or modification of audit
tests. .. "70 The Price Waterhouse proposal gives meaning to this
vague requirement by providing a checklist of procedures for audi-
tors to consider performing if any symptoms of financial statement
fraud are discovered. A comprehensive list of red flags would add
specificity to the general language of SAS 22, thereby providing the
kind of" 'fundamental guidance' " necessary to determine " 'when
an auditor ought to begin suspecting fraud.' "71
While the costs of this proposal are uncertain, implementation of
this recommendation would enable the auditor to acquire a deeper
understanding of the risks and uncertainties facing a client. An au-
ditor, however, might rely solely on the procedures included in the
checklist and fail to consider the unique risks facing a particular cli-
ent. Such an auditor might not employ additional tests needed to
better evaluate the potential for financial statement fraud.
If the checklist is fairly comprehensive, however, this scenario is
less likely. Use of this list of symptoms, coupled with the implemen-
tation of procedures to be employed when particular symptoms are
present in the company's business environment, would also boost
public confidence in the reliability and usefulness of audited finan-
cial statements, since investors would have a better idea of the ex-
tent to which the auditors had searched for symptoms of fraudulent
activities. 72 This proposal may, in addition, provide the basis for a
more manageable standard of care against which to judge auditor
performance in the event of litigation following an alleged financial
statement fraud. In such litigation, the courts could define a stan-
dard of care that would shield from liability those auditors who per-
formed the relevant checklisted procedures.
73
69. A. Arens &J. Loebbecke, supra note 12, at 151. Statements on Auditing Stan-
dards are official AICPA interpretations of the 10 generally accepted auditing standards
and are designed to assist auditors in performing their duties. Id. at 13-15. All members
of the auditing profession are required to adhere to these interpretations. Id. at 15.
70. Hearings, supra note 3, at 308, quoting SAS No. 22.
71. Yang, supra note 57, at 73 (statement by Professor D.R. Carmichael of Baruch
College, member of a special AICPA task force set up in the summer of 1985 to examine
the independent auditor's role in uncovering fraud.)
72. It appears that investors generally do not believe that audited financial state-
ments provide very useful information. Mednick discusses a 1985 Louis Harris & Asso-
ciates survey in which two-thirds of the respondents indicated that " 'qualitative
information presented outside the financial statements, such as management observa-
tions, strategic plans and goals, market growth, etc., often can be more useful than quali-
tative measures included in the financial statements.' " Mednick, supra note 43, at 71.





C. Maintaining the Confidentiality of the Auditor-Client Relationship
Any proposal that requires the independent auditor to report dis-
covered errors or irregularities to governmental authorities is likely
to foster the development of an adversarial relationship between cli-
ent and auditor.7 4 Such a requirement would encourage even hon-
est clients to provide the auditor with less than complete disclosure
out of fear that the auditor will suspect an illegal or irregular act and
report his or her suspicions to the enforcement authorities.
Professor Reinier Kraakman has described the ill effects of such a
"whistleblower" strategy. He suggests some reasons that such ex-
treme approaches are so rarely employed, noting "our deeply felt
aversion to mandatory informing. . ." as well as the incentive of reg-
ulatory targets to withhold information from potential
whistleblowers that could "transform whistleblowing into a game of
anticipatory avoidance or discharge .... -75 Indeed, even in United
States v. Arthur Young, an opinion oft-cited for its dicta concerning
the overriding duty of the auditor as a "public watchdog, ' ' 76 the
Supreme Court recognized the importance of encouraging full dis-
closure between auditor and client.77 Any acceptable solution to the
problem of financial statement fraud must preserve the confidential-
ity of this relationship.
D. Increasing Educational Requirements
Education can play a crucial role in reducing the incidence of
fraudulent financial reporting. Accounting faculty at colleges and
universities should place increasing emphasis on developing the an-
alytical skills and sense of ethical awareness necessary to detect and
prevent financial statement fraud.7 8 As has been frequently sug-
gested, undergraduate accounting curricula should be expanded
74. H.R. 5439 proposed that the auditor be required to report a discovered error or
irregularity if, within a reasonable period not to exceed 90 days, the issuer fails to cor-
rect the problem and to report it to the appropriate authorities. This was a watered
down version of a provision in H.R. 4886, which would have required the auditor to
report any known or suspected llegal acts directly to the appropriate governmental
authorities.
75. Kraakman, Gatekeepers, supra note 49, at 58-60.
76. United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 818 (1984).
77. Id. at 821 (recognizing the importance of maintaining the confidentiality of the
accountant-client relationship in order to encourage full disclosure, but finding interest
in preserving confidentiality outweighed by particular interest of IRS in securing ac-
countant's tax accrual workpapers, in light of broad discretion which Congress has
granted to IRS to perform its duties of tax collection and assessment).
78. Treadway Commission Report, supra note 23, at 76. As the Treadway Commis-
sion points out, analytical abilities and ethical awareness are equally important to the
development of competent business professionals. Id. Thus, these suggestions should
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from four to five years. 79 This additional year would enable stu-
dents to take a substantial amount of liberal arts coursework in addi-
tion to the more technical accounting courses, helping to ensure
that future auditors will develop sound reasoning and efficient
problem-solving skills. In addition to these changes at the univer-
sity level, continuing professional education requirements should
include courses that will further develop the analytical skills needed
to uncover fraudulent reporting.8 0
IV. The Accounting Profession's Quality Control Program
There has been considerable debate about the need for the ac-
counting profession to restructure its quality control program in or-
der to boost public confidence in the reliability of the independent
audit. This Part examines both sides of the debate.
A. A Proposed Statutory Self-Regulatory Organization
The Price Waterhouse position paper recommends changing the
organization and structure of the public accounting profession's
quality control program. Price Waterhouse generally approves of
the current peer review program, but notes that mere "fine tuning"
of this system is not enough "to satisfy critics that the public's inter-
est is being adequately served.""' At the same time, completely
abandoning the program in favor of SEC regulation would need-
lessly waste the profession's investment in a peer review program
that is largely effective.8 2 Furthermore, a recent study indicates that
legal regulation can exacerbate enforcement inefficiency. 3
Price Waterhouse thus proposes a compromise solution in which
much of the current quality control system would be placed under
the auspices of a statutory SRO. Such an organization would enable
governmental oversight within a system that would remain largely
self-regulatory.8 4 This proposal would require Congress to create a
new membership association under the supervision of the SEC. All
accounting firms practicing before the SEC would have to join this
be incorporated into the overall curricula of business schools and not only in the ac-
counting curricula.
79. Id. at 80.
80. Id. at 81. The AICPA and the American Accounting Association are among the
supporters of this proposal. Id.
81. Price Waterhouse, supra note 5, at 48.
82. Id.
83. Lynch et. al., supra note 54, at 71 (noting that improperly tailored legal regula-
tion can hinder development of reputations of market participants).




association, and the SEC would appoint a Board of Public Account-
ancy to govern the SRO and regulate its members.
The new Board of Public Accountancy would retain much of the
substance of current SEC Practice Section and Public Oversight
Board (POB) procedures. This new Board would have rule-making
authority, subject to formal SEC oversight, over such areas as: nom-
ination and election of board members to succeed the initial appoin-
tees; quality control, competence, and financial responsibility;
disciplinary procedures; and admission to the new SRO. The Board
of Public Accountancy would have disciplinary authority over mem-
ber firms, subject to SEC review, and due process protections would
be provided for all membership and disciplinary actions brought by
the Board or reviewed by the SEC. Such disciplinary authority
would include the power to impose sanctions for violation of Board
rules. The sanctions would include expulsion; suspension; limita-
tion of activities, functions and operations; fines; censure; and de-
nial of SRO membership. The proposal would also preserve the
confidentiality of information relating to particular audits, thereby
creating a "Chinese Wall" between the SEC and the SRO. 85
This proposal to create a statutory SRO has been the subject of
considerable discussion. Although the SEC has not yet reached a
general conclusion as to the need for an SRO, 86 it has already ex-
pressed unanimous opposition to Price Waterhouse's specific pro-
posal for a limited SRO that would maintain a veil of confidentiality
between it and the Commission. 87 SEC Commissioner Aulana Pe-
ters noted that the SRO proposed by Price Waterhouse would "iso-
late the SRO from the SEC, contrary to the relationship the
Commission has with other self-regulatory bodies." 88
John Burton, former SEC Chief Accountant and Dean of the Co-
lumbia University Graduate School of Business, has long been in
favor of establishing a statutory SRO.8 9 Burton disapproves of the
current peer review program's wholly remedial focus. He believes
that the public would have greater confidence in such a program if
punitive actions were taken, punishing firms that have not per-
formed up to par, rather than merely ensuring that necessary im-
provements in a firm's quality control system are instituted. In
85. See id. at 49-57 for a more detailed description of this proposal.
86. Hearings, supra note 3, at 312.
87. Grisdela, SEC to Oppose Bill That Forces Auditors to Report Possible Fraud by
Their Clients, Wall St. J., June 20, 1986, at 4, col. 3.
88. Id.
89. See Burton, supra note 58, at 19.
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Burton's view, a statutory SRO is likely to be more effective in
achieving this punitive focus. 90
The Treadway Commission has also studied the possibility of cre-
ating a statutory SRO to govern the profession's quality control ef-
forts. The Commission notes that the functions of an SRO are to
establish standards of professional or commercial conduct and to
impose meaningful sanctions on members who violate such stan-
dards. 9' It concludes that the profession's current peer review pro-
gram, combined with the additional requirement of SECPS
membership for all firms auditing SEC registrants, and a vigorous
SEC that doles out appropriate penalties for those firms and individ-
uals that perform at substandard levels, would obviate the need for
an SRO. 92 The Commission's conclusion is compelling; if the SEC
is adequately funded and is willing to punish auditors who fail to
comply with accepted performance standards, then adoption of an
SRO would needlessly duplicate existing quality control functions.
93
B. Mandatory SECPS Membership
Public confidence in the financial reporting system can be in-
creased as much, if not more so, by the SEC than by an SRO. 94 The
self-regulatory peer review program, with a largely remedial focus,
should not be considered in isolation; rather, it must be
remembered that SEC enforcement actions and private litigation
provide substantial opportunities for punitive sanctions to be as-
sessed against wrongdoing auditors and auditing firms. 9 5 AICPA
Chairman J. Michael Cook and others, 96 therefore, advocate retain-
ing the current peer review program. They would, however, require
that any firm practicing before the SEC be a member of the SEC
Practice Section. Such mandatory membership would give the Pub-
lic Oversight Board (POB), which governs the operation of the peer
review program, greater leverage against SECPS member firms,
since these firms could no longer opt out of the POB's jurisdiction
without losing the opportunity to practice before the SEC. As a re-
90. SEC Roundtable, supra note 40, at 18.
91. Treadway Commission Initial Conclusions, supra note 28, at 88,288.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. The SEC is already more visibly acknowledging such a confidence-building role
in the insider-trading context. See, e.g., Nash, Suddenly a Sleepy S.E.C. Is Wide Awake,
N.Y. Times, Nov. 23, 1986, at E5.
95. SEC Roundtable, supra note 40, at 18. See also Hearings, supra note 6, at 311-12.
96. See Berton, supra note 2 (seven of the Big Eight accounting firms have urged the





suit, the public would have greater confidence in the effectiveness of
the peer review program.
Mandatory SECPS membership might also lead to real reductions
in fraudulent financial reporting. A recent Treadway Commission
study of actions brought by the SEC against independent auditors
revealed that 64% of the actions involved firms that were not mem-
bers of the SECPS.97 Thus, firms that are not SECPS members ap-
pear less likely to detect and prevent financial statement fraud than
SECPS member firms.
Several of the approximately 800 (mostly smaller) non-SECPS
member firms have severely criticized the peer review program, ex-
pressing concern about the cost-effectiveness of peer review.98 Ac-
cording to AICPA data, however, the costs of this program are not
excessive. Annual dues for SECPS membership are $15 per profes-
sional staff member in the firm, but cannot exceed $100 if the firm
has less than five SEC registrants as clients.99 The cost of a triennial
peer review for a "small" firm (i.e., a firm with less than twenty pro-
fessional staff members) averages between $2,200 and $6,000.100
Given the relatively low costs of SECPS membership, along with the
benefits of real reductions in the incidence of fraud and greater pub-
lic confidence due to increased POB credibility, all firms auditing
SEC registrants should be required to join the SECPS.
Conclusion
Seven cost-effective recommendations emerge from this analysis
of the financial statement fraud debate:
First, companies should be required to institute sufficient internal
management controls in addition to the current statutory mandate
to implement internal accounting controls.
Second, increased attention should be placed on using the inter-
nal audit staff to prevent and detect financial statement fraud. The
Treadway Commission has recognized the importance of enhancing
the internal auditor's "organizational status and professional-
ism."' 0 1 The internal audit group should be independent of those
involved in the financial statement preparation process and should
97. Treadway Commission Report, supra note 23, at 117. See supra note 24 for an
description of the data examined in the study.
98. See Hearings, supra note 3, at 311. These firms have also expressed concern
about the program's domination by larger firms. Id. See also Berton, supra note 2.
99. Hearings, supra note 3, at 311.
100. Id. The average cost of a peer review of a Big Eight firm is about $800,000. Id.
101. Treadway Commission Initial Conclusions, supra note 28, at 88,285,
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have unlimited, direct access to the audit committee. In addition,
professional certification of internal auditors should be required,
and increased emphasis should be placed on development of, and
adherence to, internal auditing standards. In light of the independ-
ent auditor's increasing reliance on the internal auditor's work, it is
important to take these steps to ensure that effective monitoring of
financial statement preparation can take place.
Third, all publicly held corporations should be required to have
audit committees. Such committees can provide effective monitor-
ing of the internal control system as well as an important link to the
internal audit staff.
Fourth, the sanctions imposed on perpetrators of financial state-
ment fraud should be increased. Barring from corporate office
those responsible for fraudulent financial reporting can provide
greater levels of deterrence than fines alone, since the effectiveness
of fines is limited by the net assets of wrongdoers. Appropriate due
process protections should be instituted to minimize the chance of
error and thus to prevent innocent managers from becoming too
risk averse.
Fifth, while primary emphasis should be placed on improving the
internal audit staff and stiffening the penalties imposed on perpetra-
tors of fraudulent reporting, the independent auditor's duties must
also be clarified. The independent auditor is an effective gatekeeper
substantially constrained by concerns with maintaining his or her
reputation in the market for auditing services. Reputation, how-
ever, does have its limits as a constraining force. As a result, the
public auditor also faces legal liability for substandard work. If legal
duties are made too strong, however, gatekeeping services may be-
come prohibitively expensive or, alternatively, gatekeepers may
quit. 0 2 Because it is becoming increasingly difficult to attract qual-
ity people into the auditing profession and auditors are already be-
ing crippled by large damage awards in litigation, a clarification of
current auditing standards is needed to avert these risks. Requiring
the auditor to review and evaluate internal accounting and manage-
ment controls is a low-cost way to ensure that the auditor has a
proper understanding of the client's business environment and in-
ternal control system. Such an understanding is vital to the success-
ful prevention and detection of fraudulent financial reporting.
In addition, the independent auditor should be required to moni-
tor the client's business environment for any "red flags" that warn




of potential fraud, and at least to consider performing relevant pro-
cedures designed to uncover such fraud. This requirement should
enhance the likelihood of detecting fraudulent reporting. At the
same time, it should also encourage courts to engage in a more def-
erential, procedural review of the independent auditor's perform-
ance, making it less likely that an auditor who complies with the
requirement will be held liable for failing to uncover fraud.
Sixth, educational requirements should be stiffened to help en-
sure that the independent auditor has the analytical and ethical
training to detect and prevent fraudulent reporting. Accounting
programs at colleges and universities should be extended an addi-
tional year, and continuing professional educational programs
should be designed to further develop the auditor's ability to un-
cover fraud.
Seventh, all firms auditing SEC registrants should be required to
join the SEC Practice Section. This would give the Professional
Oversight Board sufficient leverage over auditing firms to make the
peer review program a more effective weapon against fraudulent fi-
nancial reporting.
While financial statement fraud is a problem, it does not warrant
wholesale restructuring of the accounting profession. Adoption of
these cost-effective measures, combined with a vigilant and ade-
quately funded SEC, will preserve the integrity of our financial re-
porting system.
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